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Abstract
When addressing the notion of proper time in the theory of relativity, it is usually taken
for granted that the time read by an accelerated clock is given by the Minkowski proper
time. However, there are authors like Harvey Brown that consider necessary an extra
assumption  to  arrive  at  this  result,  the  so-called  clock  hypothesis.  In  opposition  to
Brown, Richard TW Arthur takes the clock hypothesis  to be already implicit  in the
theory. In this paper I will present a view different from these authors by taking into
account Einstein’s notion of natural clock and showing its relevance to the debate.
1 Introduction: the notion of natural clock
Up until the mid 20th century the metrological definition of second was made in terms of
astronomical  motions.  First  in  terms  of  the  Earth’s  rotation  taken  to  be  uniform
(Barbour 2009, 2-3), i.e. the sidereal time; then in terms of the so-called ephemeris time,
in which time was calculated,  using Newton’s theory,  from the motion of the Moon
(Jespersen and Fitz-Randolph 1999, 104-6). The measurements of temporal durations
relied on direct astronomical observation or on instruments (clocks) calibrated to the
motions in the ‘heavens’. However soon after the adoption of a definition of second
based on the ephemeris time, the improvements on atomic frequency standards led to a
new definition of the second in terms of the resonance frequency of the cesium atom.
Motions within the solar system were set aside as the ultimate motion from which all
motions were compared and time was measured; a new time scale was put forward in
terms of a new definition of second based on a specific number of atomic transitions of
the  cesium atom and a new instrument  to  measure  these transition  (i.e.  to  measure
‘time’) was developed: the atomic clock (Jespersen and Fitz-Randolph 1999, 53-61).
In a way this change in the metrology of time was anticipated in developments in
theoretical physics. In the late 19th and early 20th century several thinkers were involved
with issues related to the so-called electrodynamics of moving bodies. In his criticism of
Lorentz’s electron theory and its extension to the case of matter in (inertial) motion,
Poincaré noticed that what for Lorentz was a mathematical artifice – that of rewriting
his equations for the case of moving bodies in terms of auxiliary variables one of which
Lorentz  had  called  local  time  –,  could  have  a  completely  different  physical
interpretation. According to Poincaré the local time can be the time being measured by
observers in motion with the material bodies in question that synchronize their clocks
by exchanging light  signals  (Poincaré  1900,  272).  This  procedure for synchronizing
clocks had been presented by Poincaré, for the particular case of clocks taken to be at
rest, in an earlier work published in 1898. In this work Poincaré mentions that even the
best clocks, by that time still mechanical clocks, had to be calibrated to the sidereal time
(Poincaré 1898, 3). We can still read Poincaré’s 1900 remarks in the light of his 1898
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memoir, i.e., implicitly, the clocks are taken to have been calibrated to sidereal time.
However,  due  to  the  issue  of  the  setting  of  the  initial  phase  of  distant  clocks  (the
synchronization  of  the  clocks),  Poincaré  discusses  the  relation  between  the  time
intervals read by the clocks in an apparently autonomous way. 
This trend is stronger in Einstein’s 1905 paper on the electrodynamics of moving
bodies,  nowadays  known as  the  paper  in  which  made  its  appearance  the  theory  of
relativity.1 From the start Einstein develops his views in terms of measuring rods and
clocks belonging to different inertial reference frames in relative motion. In this paper
Einstein considers clocks “of exactly the same constitution” (Einstein 1905, 142). This
means that the clocks are taken to have the same rate from the start (see, e.g., Einstein
1916, 273). Several things must be mentioned at this point. There is a threefold aspect
to the notion of clock as used by Einstein. On one part, the term ‘clock’ refers to a
particular instrument, e.g. the balance wheel clock, i.e. to real clocks (Einstein 1905,
153).2 But  also,  as  Einstein’s  admits  in  later  writings,  ‘clock’  is  employed  as  an
independent  concept  in  the  development  of  the  theory  (Einstein  1921,  212-3).  This
connects with the third aspect I want to mention. As a dynamical system the clock must
be taken to be in agreement with the predictions of the theory, i.e. even if the clock is
inbuilt  into  the  theory  as  an  independent  concept  in  the  definition  of  the  inertial
reference frame, it must be consistent with the dynamics built on top of the kinematics
defined in part in terms of the inertial reference frames. Ultimately, Einstein’s view is
that this situation is not desirable:
In the present stage of development of theoretical physics these concepts must still be
employed as independent  concepts;  for we are still  far  from possessing such certain
knowledge of the theoretical principles of atomic structure as to be able to construct
solid bodies and clocks theoretically from elementary concepts. (Einstein 1921, 213) 
One  is  struck  that  the  theory  …  introduces  two  kinds  of  physical  things,  i.e.  (1)
measuring rods and clocks, (2) all other things … strictly speaking measuring rods and
clocks would have to be represented as solutions of the basic equations …, nor as it
were, as theoretically self-sufficient entities. (Einstein 1969, 59-61; see also Giovanelli
2014)3
1 In this work it is adopted Fock (1959) terminology. Instead of adopting special and general relativity to
name  Einstein’s  two  theories,  one  refers  to  the  1905  theory  of  relativity  and  the  1915  theory  of
gravitation.  The discussion on natural  clocks,  proper  time and the clock  hypothesis  is  made only in
reference to the theory of relativity.  It  is beyond the scope of this work to address these issues in the
context of Einstein’s theory of gravitation.
2 As such, even if Einstein does not address this issue, we must take the clock as ultimately calibrated to
sidereal  time,  unless  there  is  an  argument  to  do  otherwise;  Einstein  himself  makes  explicit  in  later
writings the notion of natural clock, which I see as anticipating in part the later adoption of the atomic
time scale based on atomic clocks.
3 Einstein early philosophy is usually considered as a form of empiricism, to some close to what later
become  known  as  operationalism,  even  if  there  is  disagreement  regarding  Einstein’s  operationalist
sympathies  (see,  e.g.,  Paty 1993, 349-365, Scheibe 2001, 72-73; Dieks 2010, 228-35).  On first  sight
Einstein’s view of rods and clocks as independent conceptual elements of the theory might seem to be an
example of this philosophical position. That is not the case. To Einstein, ideally, a physical theory must
conform  to  Poincaré’s  conventionalist  thesis  (see,  e.g.,  Einstein  1921,  212;  Paty  1992,  7-8),  which
Einstein takes to mean that only the conjunction of a mathematical structure G with a physical part P is
tested experimentally. This implies in particular that concepts like length and duration would not have a
direct operational meaning (Dieks 2010, 229). However, Einstein also recognizes that in the present stage
of development of physics, a physical theory does not conform to Poincaré’s conventionalism (Paty 1993,
304-5). In the context of his philosophy of geometry,  Einstein concludes that this situation implies in
particular the above-mentioned necessity of taking rods and clocks as independent conceptual elements of
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At the present stage, the clock as a (self-sufficient or independent) concept is linked in a
very  direct  way  to  the  clock  as  an  actual  measuring  instrument,  i.e.  one
compares/attributes to the clock as concept the measurements made by the measuring
instrument  that  as  such must  have been calibrated  to the adopted metrological  unit,
which was given, in Einstein’s days, by the sidereal time (i.e. the rotation of the Earth).
Even if in several places Einstein mentions balance wheel clocks (see, e.g., Einstein
1911, 344), which can only be taken as a measuring instrument after being calibrated to
the unit of time adopted, there is another type of ‘clock’ that Einstein mentions (see,
e.g., Einstein 1907a, 232; Einstein 1907b, 263; Einstein 1910, 134). Einstein noticed
that atoms could be used as clocks. In fact, in my view, Einstein anticipated the idea of
atomic  clock  in  his  writings.  The  atoms  emit  and  absorb  radiation  at  particular
frequencies.  In  this  way to the atoms of  different  elements  corresponds a  particular
‘signature’ of spectral lines (atomic spectra). According to Einstein:
Since the oscillatory phenomena that produces a spectral line must be viewed as intra-
atomic phenomena whose frequencies are uniquely determined by the nature of the ions,
we can use these ions as clocks. (Einstein 1910, 124-5)
The crucial aspect of this clock is that (at least in inertial motion) it has always the same
frequency(ies). In this way we are free to calibrate it to the sidereal time or use it to
define the unit of time, as it was done later with the adoption of the atomic time scale
based on a metrological definition of the second in terms of the ‘internal oscillations’ of
the cesium atom.4 There is another point where Einstein’s reference to natural clocks
becomes, in my view, quite important. In a couple of places Einstein makes reference to
an  assumption  ‘hidden’  in  the  derivation  of  the  Lorentz  transformations.  When
determining the transformations that relates space and time coordinates in two inertial
reference frames S and S' in relative motion with velocity υ, Einstein still has a function
ϕ(υ) undetermined (Einstein 1907b, 260). Einstein considers a third inertial reference
frame S'' moving with velocity –υ in relation to S'. This means that S and S'' coincide.
This  sets  the function  ϕ(υ)  to 1.  At this  point  Einstein mentions,  in  a footnote,  the
following:
the theory.  The clocks and rods Einstein refers  to are above all concepts of the theory,  which in the
present stage have a very direct link to instrumentation and also to the mathematical structure (this is also
the case with Einstein’s theory of gravitation; see, e.g., Einstein 1955, 63-4). As conceptual elements, the
clocks (and associated notions of duration/time interval/passage, etc.) and rods (and associated notion of
length) – and linked as they are with the geometrical structure of the theory – are not used in the context
of  the  theory  simply  as  a  representation  of  particular  instruments;  they  are  part  of  a  conceptual-
mathematical ‘definition’ of length and duration, which has a clear counterpart in experimentation via
rods and clocks as measuring instruments.  As instruments,  rods and clocks do not define length and
duration, they enable the measurement of length and duration. In conclusion, Einstein’s view on rods and
clocks as independent conceptual elements of the theory – crucial to the view developed in this work –
was developed not in the context of Einstein’s early eventual operationalism, but is related to Einstein’s
later  views  of  geometry  as  practical/physical  geometry.  In  this  way  it  does  not  fell  prey  to  any
operationalist philosophical position, which as Brown remarks “got such a bad name in philosophy, [that]
it  has  been  fashionable  for  some  time in  the  philosophical  literature  to  discuss  space-time  structure
without any reference at all to such base elements as rods and clocks” (Brown 2005, 95). 
4 When in inertial motion the atomic clocks gives/reads a time that is equal to the inertial time. We can
say that experimentally the atomic time scale and the inertial time scale are identical (Ohanian 1976,  187-
8).
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This conclusion is based on the physical assumption that the length of a measuring rod
or the rate of a clock do not undergo any permanent changes if these objects are set in
motion and then brought to rest again. (Einstein 1907b, 260)5, 6
At this point of the deduction of the Lorentz transformations, Einstein is thinking in
terms  of  an  actual  setting  into  relative  motion  of  identically  constructed  reference
frames. Instead of thinking in terms of initially given reference frames that are taken to
be in relative motion, Einstein is considering the case, e.g., of setting into motion, in
relation to the ‘given’ inertial reference frame S, the reference frame S', and later the
setting  into  motion  of  S''  in  relation  to  the  already inertial  reference  frame S'.  The
problem is in that undefined moment in which S' and S'' are no more at rest in relation to
an inertial reference frame but not yet with a constant velocity in relation to the inertial
reference frame, i.e. that moment in which S' and S''  cannot properly be consider as
inertial reference frames. It is here that the boostability assumption is, implicitly, taken
into account 7 
One might  get the impression that the assumption being beyond the principle of
relativity is somewhat ad hoc, even if necessary according to Einstein. That might not
be the case. There is a way of seeing how this assumption is inbuilt in the theory given
by Einstein himself. The justification for this assumption results from the identification
of the conceptual clock with the notion of natural clock arising in experimentation. The
clock of the theory of relativity is still a self-sufficient or independent concept, but it
represents within the theory natural clocks; and the natural clocks to which Einstein
relates his conceptual clock are atoms.8 In this way, the assumption being made with
respect to the conceptual clock inbuilt in the theory can be seen as justified when taking
into account experimental results about natural clocks. According to Einstein:
5 Einstein also refers to the assumption as the “independence of measuring rods and clocks from their past
history” (Einstein 1920, 127).
6 Brown refers to this assumption as the boostability of rods and clocks (Brown 2005, 30). Brown is clear
in the dynamical aspect of this assumption (Brown 2005, 28). However the rods and clocks as ‘primitive’
conceptual  elements  are  not  dynamically  described  in  the  theory.  This  means  that  any  dynamical
considerations being made, e.g. by reference to applied forces (Brown 2005, 95), are not rigorous, having
more a heuristic role.  
7 As a dynamical assumption, even if specific to the particular situation of a boosted reference frame, this
assumption does not follows from the principle of relativity of inertial motion, according to which “the
laws governing natural phenomena are independent of the state of motion of the [inertial reference frame]
with respect to which the phenomena are observed” (Einstein 1910, 123). The principle is circumscribed
to a statement of the equivalence of inertial frames for the description of phenomena (in more ‘modern’
terms it states that the laws of the theory are Lorentz covariant; see, e.g. Norton 1993, 796); as such it
does not bear on the issue of the boosting of the inertial reference frame itself. In this way, the boosts of
rods and clocks as primitive entities inscribed in the notion of inertial reference frame are outside the
implications of the principle of relativity.
8 Torretti associates a different notion of natural clock to Einstein, the light clock (Torretti 1983, 52-4;
Ohanian 1976, 192-3). In this context Torretti refers to Einstein’s time scale (Torretti 1983, 54). This time
scale cannot be seen as independent from the inertial time scale; as Ohanian call the attention to, the time
variable that appears in the equations of electrodynamics corresponds to an inertial time (Ohanian 1976,
195). The situation with the atomic time scale is different. It is correct that we cannot completely separate
conceptually the atomic time scale provided by an atom from the fact that, as a ‘clock’ of an inertial
reference frame, its state of motion is taken into account. However it is clear that there is an ‘internal’
physics of the atom leading to the atomic time that, at the present stage of development of theoretical
physics, is taken to be independent from the inertial time. The fact that experimentally the two time scales
coincide (Ohanian 1976, 187-8) does not mean that conceptually and in experimentation they are not
distinguished.
4
If two ideal clocks are going at the same rate at any time and at any place (being then in
immediate proximity to each other), they will always go at the same rate, no matter
where and when they are again compared with each other at one place. If this law was
not valid for natural clocks, the proper frequencies for the separate atoms of the same
chemical element would not be in such exact agreement as experience demonstrates.
(Einstein 1921, 213-4)
These remarks  are made in the context of a discussion about the so-called practical
geometry.  In  this  way  we  do  not  have  to  read  them  as  referring  strictly  to  the
boostability of clocks. In these remarks Einstein might be considering a more general
situation  than  boostability;  that  of  general  accelerations  of  the  clocks  between  two
inertial  states.  However  this  means  that  the  assumption  being  made  regarding  the
boostability of clocks (that is very specific  case of the more general acceleration of
clocks) can be seen as grounded in experimental findings regarding natural clocks. 
In fact the experimental results go beyond boosts and the more general case referred.
In this way, we can give to the assumption of the ‘independence of measuring rods and
clocks from their  past history’  a meaning more general than Einstein’s original one.
Experimentally,  the rate of natural clocks, at any particular moment,  turns out to be
independent  of  their  past  non-inertial  motion  even if  its  actual  motion  is  still  non-
inertial,  i.e.  the  rate  of  natural  clocks  is  not  affected,  in  a  direct  way,  by  their
acceleration  (see,  e.g.,  Zhang  1997,  190-4).  The  boostability  assumption  finds  its
justification in the experimental results that the rates of natural clocks are independent
of their past history in this generalized sense. 
The almost implicit adoption of this assumption regarding the conceptual clocks of
the theory can be seen as the implementation within the structure of the theory of an
experimental finding regarding natural clocks that is previous (or at least independent)
to the eventual theoretical ‘allocation’ of these experimental results using the theory of
relativity.
In my view, with the notion of natural clock Einstein is anticipating the notion of
atomic time that enabled the adoption of an atomic time scale. A natural clock has an
empirical (proper) time that stands on its own, not having to be calibrated to any motion
in  the  ‘heavens’.  In  fact  it  turns  out  that  atomic  time  enables  a  more  accurate
determination of the second (metrologically defined as the elapsed time of 9192631770
oscillations of the cesium atom) than the Earth’s rotation or the so-called ephemeris
time  (Jespersen and Fitz-Randolph 1999,  110).  I  will  try  to  show in this  paper  the
importance of this notion to clarify several conceptual issues related in particular  to
proper time, and the so-called clock hypothesis.
2 Brown’s views on proper time and the clock hypothesis
Brown applies the term proper time to mean the time read off by a real or conceptual
clock (see, e.g. Brown 2005, 29, 115). As we have seen the conceptual clock is the
counterpart within the theory of the natural (atomic) clocks. This means that ultimately,
in Brown’s account,  proper time refers to the empirical  time given by a real  clock.
Brown refers to the conceptual clock, initially for the case of inertial motion,  as the
ideal clock, and so refers to the proper time of ideal clocks. The conceptual clocks are
ideal in the sense of being clocks (in inertial motion) for which a free particle takes
equal time intervals to traverse equal distances. In this way ideal clocks are clocks that
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give a time reading according to the law of inertia (Brown 2005, 19), i.e. ideal clocks
are clocks in inertial motion that give the universal inertial time (Brown 2005, 95).9
Brown follows Einstein in his definition of coordinate time. One takes clocks at rest
in an inertial reference frame, properly synchronized; the time coordinate is the time
read by these stationary clocks (Brown 2005, 7, 19).
It is important to notice that with Minkowski, proper time is the name given to the
interval along a time-like worldline, and it is taken for granted that the duration read by
clock is given by the Minkowski proper time.10 With Brown, proper time is simply the
time (number of ‘cycles’) read off by a clock, which might or might not be equal to the
interval along the clock’s worldline (Brown 2005, 95, 115): proper time is the duration
read off by a clock independently of its state of motion being inertial or accelerated.
According to  Brown,  if  the  clock hypothesis11 applies  to  a  particular  clock (with  a
particular  acceleration),  “then  the  clock’s  proper  time  will  be  proportional  to  the
Minkowski distance along its world-line” (Brown 2005, 95).
This view is inconsistent with another of Brown’s claims.  As we have seen,  the
coordinate time is defined by synchronizing identical clocks sharing the same inertial
motion. Brown maintains (in part implicitly) that there is a difference between proper
time (in Brown’s sense) and coordinate time (see, e.g., Brown 2005, 7, 19, 29), with
which I agree. However Brown claims that coordinate time is more fundamental than
proper time (Brown 2005, 92). That cannot be the case. According to Brown’s own
‘definition’, the time being read by clocks, in inertial motion or not, is called proper
time. The coordinate time results from synchronizing clocks, in inertial motion, with an
identical proper time, i.e. the coordinate time is built in terms of the proper time (in
Brown’s sense) of the clocks of the inertial reference frame. It cannot be the case that
the coordinate time is more fundamental than proper time as defined in this way.  
In Brown’s view, the identification of the interval of a time-like worldline with the
time being measured/given by a clock on this worldline needs for its justification the
clock hypothesis. This is a dynamical condition that a clock must follow (more exactly,
its theoretical model). Brown makes his point in terms of a classical picture based on the
concept of force: a clock is seen as a complex dynamical system whose cyclic behaviour
is described by taking it  to be an isolated system described dynamically by internal
forces.  If  the  external  forces  that  accelerate  the  clock  along  a  particular  time-like
worldline are small in comparison to the internal forces they will not affect the cyclic
behaviour of the clock and because of this its timekeeping. Under this condition the
9 In a couple of places Brown uses the term inertial clock instead of ideal clock to refer to a (conceptual)
clock  in  inertial  motion giving  the inertial  time (Brown 2005,  19,  97).  To  simplify the terminology
adopted in this work, and avoid confusion with Arthur’s terminology, I will simply refer to conceptual
clocks. 
10 As it is well known, Minkowski presented the notion of proper time in 1908. By definition the proper
time is associated just to substantial material systems to which one can associate time-like worldlines. For
this particular case one considers the invariant infinitesimal interval along the worldline at the position of
the material system c2dτ2 = c2dt2 – dx2 – dy2 – dz2. According to Minkowski, "The integral ∫dτ = τ of this
amount, taken along the world-line from any fixed starting-point P0 to the variable endpoint P, we call the
"proper-time" of the substantial point in P" (Minkowski 1908, 85). Immediately after defining proper
time, Minkowski determines the motion-vector and acceleration-vector using dτ as the infinitesimal time
interval gone by the material system.
11 In Brown's own words, the clock hypothesis is “the claim that when a clock is accelerated, the effect of
motion on the rate of the clock is no more than that associated with its  instantaneous velocity – the
acceleration adds nothing” (Brown 2005, 9). According to Brown this is the case when “the external
forces  accelerating the clock are small in relation to the internal  'restoring'  forces  at  work inside the
clock” (Brown 2005, 115).
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time being given by the clock’s cycles (that Brown calls the proper time) is identical to
the interval along the worldline (Brown 2005, 95).
By applying the clock hypothesis to the conceptual clock as a physical (dynamical)
system, one has to show: (1) that acceleration has no effect on the rate of the clock, i.e.
the effect of motion on the rate of the clock is no more than that associated with the
instantaneous  velocity  (Brown  2005,  9);  (2)  that  in  this  situation  it  follows
straightforwardly from the theory that the proper time of the clock is identical to the
Minkowski interval along the time-like worldline (Brown 2005, 95). In this way, it is
supposed to  follow directly  that  clocks  undisturbed  by an  acceleration  give  a  time
reading according to Minkowski’s definition of proper time, as the integral  τ =  ∫ds/c
along a time-like  worldline,  where ds2 = c2dt2 – dx2 – dy2 – dz2.  To simplify let  us
consider a clock accelerated along the x axis; we can write ds as dt sqrt(1 – (dx/dt)2/c2),
i.e. ds = dt sqrt(1 – υ2/c2), where υ is the instantaneous velocity of the accelerated clock
(see,  e.g.  Bohm 1965, 163).  In this  way we have,  for the integral  along a time-like
worldline  that  Minkowski  called  proper  time,  τ =  ∫sqrt(1  –  υ2/c2)  dt.  Importantly,
∫ds/c was calculated without any reference to the time reading of the accelerated clock. 
To establish a  connection  between  ∫ds/c  and the time reading of the accelerated
clock,  one  considers  an  infinite  set/sequence  of  inertial  reference  frames,  each  one
located  at  a  point  of the clock’s trajectory and with a velocity  equal  to the clock’s
instantaneous velocity at that point (see, e.g. Bohm 1965, 162-3). For each one of these
inertial reference frames, let dt’ be the time reading of a clock of the inertial reference
frame located momentarily side by side with the accelerated clock; in this case ds’ = c
dt’. According to the theory of relativity ds’ = ds, i.e. dt’ = dt sqrt (1– υ2/c2). In this way
we establish a relation between the time readings of clocks of two inertial reference
frames (i.e.  a relation between coordinate  times),  one in which the worldline of the
accelerated clock is described an another in which the accelerated clock is momentarily
at rest. 
It is here that the connexion with the time reading of the accelerated clock is made.
One takes the rate of the accelerated clock not to be affected by the acceleration, i.e. by
the non-inertial  motion.  In this  way,  the accelerated  clock and the momentarily  co-
moving clock (in inertial motion) have the same rate. This means that we identify, for
each momentarily co-moving inertial reference frame, dt’ with the time measured by the
accelerated clock. Since dt’ = dt sqrt (1– υ2/c2), the rate of the accelerated clock only
depends on its instantaneous velocity (as measured in the inertial reference frame in
which  the  worldline  of  the  accelerated  clock  is  described).  In  Brown’s  view,  this
connexion  of  the  time  reading  of  the  accelerated  clock  with  the  time  reading  of  a
momentarily  co-moving  clock  in  inertial  motion  is  made  by resort  to  a  dynamical
assumption regarding the workings of the accelerated clock, which is not a consequence
of the postulates of the theory of relativity, the clock hypothesis (see, e.g., Brown and
Pooley 2001, 264-5).
The final step is to ‘sum’ over the time readings of all the momentarily co-moving
(inertial)  clocks,  arriving  at  the  same  mathematical  expression  (an  integral)  that
Minkowski called the proper time. In this ‘derivation’ we are suppose to be showing the
identity between an integral  ∫ds/c calculated in terms of the coordinates of a reference
frame and an infinite summation of infinitesimal elements ds’/c (i.e. dt’) of different
inertial reference frames, corresponding to time readings of different clocks belonging
each to a different frame.  Following Brown we might  say that the clock hypothesis
enables to identify for each frame the time reading of the accelerated clock with these
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elements dt’.12 In this way, the total time reading of the accelerated clock is equal to the
summation dt1’ + dt2’ + dt3’ + …. For a large number of co-moving inertial reference
frames, this sum is supposed to approach the Minkowski integral.  What we have then is
an infinite summation ∑dtn’= ∑ sqrt(1– υn2/c2)dt, where υn is the instantaneous velocity
of the accelerated clock when momentarily at rest in relation to the inertial reference
frame number n. We take this summation to be replaceable by the integral  ∫ sqrt(1–
υ2/c2)dt, which corresponds to the Minkowski definition of proper time.
As this ‘derivation’ shows, it  seems necessary a dynamical assumption to justify
attributing to an accelerated clock the same rate as a clock in inertial motion in relation
to which it is momentarily at rest. This is, in Brown’s view, an extra condition that a
clock must satisfy in order to identify its time reading (called by Brown proper time)
with  the  integral  of  the  invariant  infinitesimal  interval  along  a  time-like  worldline
(called by Minkowski proper time). 
3 Arthur’s views on proper time and the clock hypothesis
To  Arthur,  Minkowski  most  enduring  contribution  to  physics  was,  more  than  the
definition, the discovery that the theory of relativity enables a new notion of time that
Minkowski called the proper time (Arthur 2010, 159). In Arthur’s view the theory of
relativity brings with it a degeneracy of the concept of time in two different concepts:
proper  time  and  coordinate  time  (Arthur  2008,  207-8).  The  importance  of  this
bifurcation can be seen in Arthur's view when addressing the issue of what notion of
becoming the theory enables. According to Arthur:
in [the theory of relativity] the becoming of events in succession, the rate of a process or
the rate at which a thing ages, is tracked by proper time; the synchronization of distant
events is tracked by the time-coordinate function (Arthur 2008, 208).13, 14
It is the time elapsing along a particular path in spacetime [(i.e. the proper time)] that
measures how fast the processes traversing that path are going, how fast the people or
things undergoing them are ageing, how fast they are becoming. (Arthur 2008, 217)
To Arthur, proper time is a physical quantity predicted by the theory of relativity, since
it is invariant, i.e. independent of the particular inertial reference frame adopted (Arthur
2010, 177). This temporal physical quantity associated with a (material) physical system
12 This sentence is applicable both in Brown’s  as in Arthur’s  case;  both take into account  the clock
hypothesis even if disagree on its ‘place’ in the theory. My position is a bit different. For the case of
natural clocks, their behaviour under acceleration is an input physical assumption that we ascribe to their
conceptual counterpart within the theory, i.e. we do not need any reference to a clock hypothesis in the
case of natural clocks. Its ‘utility’ would be restricted only to the case, e.g., of mechanical clocks like the
balance wheel clock or the pendulum.
13 The time coordinate at a particular location in a real/conceptual inertial reference frame can be seen as
given by the time reading of a natural/conceptual clock (that we take to have been synchronized with the
rest of natural/conceptual clocks of the inertial reference frame). Since an event, like a thunder striking
next to the clock, as a space-time point is given by the time reading of the clock and its position in the
inertial  reference  frame,  when  we  talk  about  the  synchronization  of  distant  events  we  are  actually
referring to the synchronization of the natural/conceptual clocks in inertial motion. In this way, it is the
shared inertial/atomic time of all the clocks of the inertial reference frame that enables the definition of
the time coordinate (by synchronizing the clocks), and from this the synchronization of distant events. In
this way the bifurcation of time in the theory would ultimately rely on the distinction not of coordinate
time and the Minkowski proper time, but of the atomic/inertial time from the Minkowski proper time. 
14 Several authors defend the view that becoming in the theory of relativity is tracked by the proper time
(see, e.g., Dieks 1988, 2006; Savitt 2011)
8
is calculated as an integral along the time-like worldline of the physical system (i.e. as
the Minkowski proper time). It is important to stress the term ‘calculated’ instead of
'measured'.  In  Arthur’s  view proper  time  is  defined in  the  theory and as  such it  is
extracted  from  its  mathematical  structure  by  performing  the  above-mentioned
calculation along a time-like worldline.
To Arthur it is clear that “as defined, the proper time cannot be evaluated without
adopting a system of coordinates” (Arthur 2010, 161). However in his view this does
not  leads  to  any  conceptual  dependence  of  proper  time  in  relation  to  the  inertial
(coordinate) time. According to Arthur, 
for  the  time  elapsed along any worldline  [the  proper  time]  gives  a  measure  that  is
independent of the co-ordinates, even if a particular frame must be adopted in order to
calculate its value. (Arthur 2010, 161)15 
To Arthur there is a notion that is predicted by the theory; that of ideal clock (Arthur
2010, 159):16 an ideal clock is one that reads proper time (Arthur 2010, 166). However
Arthur also writes that "in the context of the global Minkowski spacetime of [the theory
of relativity] the fact that an ideal clock indicates proper time follows straightforwardly"
(Arthur 2010, 172). I think that in this sentence when Arthur refers to ‘ideal clock’ he is
actually thinking about theoretical models of a real clock that behaves as an ideal clock.
This is the only way I can make sense of this sentence without being in contradiction
with Arthur’s view that ideal clocks reading Minkowski’s proper time are predicted or
implicitly determined by the theory. In fact this reading of Arthur also enables to make
sense of his remarks about the clock hypothesis. According to Arthur:
[The clock hypothesis] does not have the status of an independent hypothesis, but is
simply a description of the behaviour of an ideal clock as predicted by [the theory of
relativity]”. (Arthur 2010, 159)
The [clock hypothesis]  is  not  needed  as  an  independent  postulate  in  [the  theory  of
relativity]. Insofar as it can be regarded as stating the criterion for an ideal clock in [the
theory of relativity], it is already implicit in that theory in the invariance of proper time.
(Arthur 2010, 177)
Thinking in terms of a more or less heuristic model of a clock whose time reading when
accelerated his equal to the invariant Minkowski interval, the clock hypothesis is a very
general  criterion  –  stated  in  terms  of  a  very  general  description  of  the  dynamical
behaviour of clocks –, that any particular accelerated clock most follow to behave as an
ideal clock (implicitly determined by the invariant Minkowski interval). This is the case
when the effect of the acceleration on the workings of a clock can be considered as very
small in relation to the ‘internal forces’ at work within the clock. One example of an
ideal clock is, according to Arthur, an atomic clock (Arthur 2010, 168). 
15 Arthur even contends that “the whole content of relativity theory can now be framed in terms of [the
proper  time],  so  that  co-ordinates  are  no  longer  regarded  as  primitive”  (Arthur  2010,  161-2).  It  is
important to notice that only along the time-like worldline can the coordinates be seen as functions of
proper time, when taken to be parameterised by the proper time. It is only in this strict sense that one
should read Arthur’s reference to the coordinates as no longer primitive. Minkowski’s presentation is
clearer on this. According to him, “on the world-line we regard x, y, z, t … as functions of the proper time
τ” (Minkowski 1908, 85 [my emphasis]).
16 Elsewhere Arthur writes that an ideal clock is "implicitly determined by theory" (Arthur 2010, 168).
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Arthur  is  clear  in  separating  the  clock  hypothesis  –  taken  to  be  very  general
dynamical criterion that he takes to be implicit in the theory – from the issue of whether
a  particular  physical  system  will  behave  as  an  ideal  clock  (Arthur  2010,  167-8).
According to Arthur “the argument that many real clocks will fail to satisfy the clock
hypothesis is just the claim that many processes fail to qualify as ideal clocks” (Arthur
2010, 177).
However this brings an issue that Arthur does not address. According to Arthur the
becoming of physical systems is given/tracked by the Minkowski proper time. Since it
is quite easy to have physical systems that when accelerated will not behave as ideal
clocks, one example being the pendulum clock (see, e.g., Arthur 2010, 167), we face the
problem of how to track the becoming for these physical systems that do not behave as
ideal clocks? Is it still given by the Minkowski proper time or, e.g., by the ‘cycles’ of
the physical system?
4 A different view in terms of the notion of natural clock
As we have seen,  the  conceptual  clock as  a  concept  of  the theory of  relativity  has
implicit boostability as a dynamical assumption. This is not simply a necessary but ad
hoc theoretical assumption. It can be seen as arising from an experimental finding, that
the rate of natural clocks (e.g. atoms) does not depend on their past history (see, e.g.,
Zhang 1997, 190-4). This justifies ascribing the boostability to conceptual clocks, as the
counterpart within the theory of natural clocks.
Taking explicitly into account the completed theory of relativity, it turns out that the
independence of past history means that natural clocks read proper time as defined by
Minkowski. Taking the conceptual clock as the conceptual counterpart of the natural
clock, it must also be an ideal clock in Arthur’s sense of having a time reading whose
value is identical to the Minkowski proper time when in non-inertial motion.
As we have seen, the coordinate time is defined by synchronizing natural/conceptual
clocks  of  an  inertial  reference  frame,  i.e.  by  setting  the  phase  of  clocks  sharing  a
universal atomic/inertial time. Following Arthur we might say that the construction of
the theory of relativity led to the appearance of another temporal physical quantity that
is built in terms of the system of coordinates but that is independent of any particular
system  of  coordinates  chosen:  the  Minkowski  proper  time.  This  would  warrant,
according to Arthur, the bifurcation of time.
The problem with this view is that the theoretical construction of the theory is made
by taking  into  account  clocks  to  which  the  boostability  assumption  applies,  i.e.  by
taking into account experimental results regarding the empirical proper time of atomic
clocks. It is correct that we do not use as a physical input assumption the experimental
result that the empirical proper time of atomic clocks under acceleration corresponds to
the Minkowski proper time. Before the theory was built we did not have any notion of
Minkowski  proper  time,  and  historically  the  more  general  experiments  related  to
accelerated  physical  systems  that  I  am  making  reference  to  where  made  after  the
development of the theory of relativity.17 However it is difficult to maintain a complete
independence  of  the  Minkowski  proper  time  as  a  physical  quantity  from  the
17 As we have seen, Einstein only mentions the ‘independence from past history’ in the more specific
sense that identical clocks that are again in relative inertial rest have the same rate independently of their
past motions.
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experimental results about the proper time of atomic clocks since these are in part taken
into account in the development of the theory; specifically, according to Einstein, in the
notions of inertial reference frame and in the deduction of the Lorentz transformations
(Einstein 1907b, 260, 263; Einstein 1910, 134).
In my view, the coordinate time and in part the Minkowski proper time, can be seen
as arising from taking into account in the theory’s construction the empirical (proper)
time of natural clocks. In this way, there is another relevant notion of time at work in
the theory of relativity that of empirical proper time of natural clocks.
In fact if we accept a clear-cut bifurcation of time in the theory of relativity in terms
of  the  coordinate  (inertial)  time  and  the  Minkowski  proper  time  we  soon  face
difficulties. Let us for the sake of the argument accept Arthur’s view on becoming. As
we have seen the bifurcation of time according to Arthur leads to very different roles to
the coordinate (inertial) time and the Minkowski proper time; the becoming of physical
systems is  given/tracked by the Minkowski  proper  time,  and the synchronization  of
distant events is given by the time coordinate (Arthur 2008, 208). 
Let us consider a clock in inertial motion. According to Arthur, the becoming of the
clock is tracked by/calculated using the Minkowski proper time. However, in this case
the Minkowski proper time has the same value as the time coordinate of the clock under
consideration (i.e. the clock’s atomic/inertial time). To Arthur, "this is only numerical
equality, not identity" (Arthur 2008, 219).
From the perspective of a clock as a natural (atomic) clock, its time reading (i.e. its
empirical proper time as given by the clock’s ‘cycles’)  is ascribed to the clock as a
conceptual element of the theory. In the case of an inertial motion, following Arthur,
this  would  give  rise  only  to  the  coordinate  (inertial)  time  not  the  ‘number  of  the
becoming’ of the atomic/conceptual clock; the becoming would be given/tracked by the
Minkowski proper time that in the case of an inertial motion is numerically identical to
the time coordinate of the clock. In terms of the atomic clock, the Minkowski proper
time would be identical to the empirical proper time, but in Arthur’s view this identity
would not point to the possibility that the numerical description of the becoming of the
atomic clock in the theory has its ‘root’ in the empirical proper time of the atomic clock
that  corresponds  to  the  atomic/inertial  time  (in  the  case  of  an  inertial  motion);  the
atomic clock’s becoming would be derived/calculated via theory through the invariant
Minkowski  interval.  In  my  view  this  is  not  correct.  To  see  why  let  us  begin  by
considering the case of accelerated clocks. I will focus on two types of clocks: natural
clocks, which in the case of the theory of relativity means atomic clocks (more exactly,
atoms), and mechanical clocks like the pendulum. 
The atomic clock and the pendulum behave in a very different way under ‘strong’
accelerations. Experimentally, the atomic clock’s empirical proper time is identical to
the Minkowski proper time (see, e.g., Zhang 1997, 190-4). In the case of the pendulum,
for moderate accelerations it gives a time reading according to the Minkowski proper
time but under a stronger acceleration the empirical  proper time of the pendulum is
different from the Minkowski proper time (Arthur 2010, 167).  Let us consider that
there  is  an argument  to  maintain  that  even in  this  case we might  consider  that  the
becoming of the pendulum is tracked by the Minkowski proper time (Arthur does not
present this argument but I will give it here). This would seem as confirming Arthur’s
view, since the becoming would be given by the Minkowski proper time independently
of the time reading of a clock. In the case of inertial motions the time reading of a clock
is identical to the Minkowski proper time as in the case of what Arthur called ideal
clocks. But there are also physical systems that do not behave as ideal clocks, which
nonetheless have their becoming given by the Minkowski proper time. This would seem
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to vindicate Arthur’s views: the empirical proper time of an accelerated clock might be
different from the Minkowski proper time that gives the actual time gone by the clock
(in Arthur’s view tracking the becoming of the clock). Only in the case of an inertial
motion there is an apparent conflation of the Minkowski proper time with the coordinate
(inertial) time corresponding to the empirical proper time.
However  there  is  a  loophole  in  this  argumentation.  I  treated  atomic  clocks  and
physical systems, like the pendulum, at an equal footing. But this cannot be done. As
Einstein mentioned, the clocks associated to the notion of time (in the inertial reference
frames),  enter  the  theory  as  self-sufficient  and  theoretically  independent  conceptual
elements  of  the  theory.  The  atomic  clock  as  a  ‘source’  of  atomic  time  (in  inertial
motion) is not theoretically describe in the theory of relativity; on the contrary, as we
have seen, there are physical input assumptions being made (and ascribed to clocks as
conceptual elements of the theory), by taking into account experimental results about
atomic  clocks.  To  consider  that  the  Minkowski  proper  time  gives  the  becoming  of
atomic clocks is to reverse the order of things.18 We have atomic clocks as fundamental
elements of the theory.  We must consider, when adopting Arthur’s views, that their
empirical proper time is marking the becoming of the atomic clocks. This implies that
the time coordinate of the clocks in inertial motion already gives the numerical value of
the  becoming.  In the case of  an accelerated  motion,  the  proper  time of  accelerated
atomic clock is different from the shared proper time of all atomic clocks in inertial
motion;  there  is  a  ‘slowing  down’  of  the  accelerated  atomic  clock’s  becoming  in
relation to the becoming of the atomic clocks in inertial motion (see, e.g., Arthur 2010,
164).  The theory provides an invariant expression that enables to calculate the atomic
clock’s empirical proper time. This is the Minkowski proper time. This is quite fantastic
since, as mentioned, we did not take into account all the experimental knowledge about
accelerated  atomic  clocks  to  formulate  the  theory.  Regarding  acceleration  the  only
assumption inbuilt in the theory was the boostability assumption. However the fact that
the theory has the Minkowski proper time as an invariant quantity does not make this
quantity  more fundamental  than the empirical  proper time of atomic clocks  that  we
started with in the first place. 
Let us now return to the issue of physical systems, like the pendulum, that when
accelerated do not behave as ideal clocks.  The ‘root’ of time in the theory of relativity
is in the natural clocks, i.e. atoms. The pendulum or any other complex system can be
seen as constituted by these simpler building blocks that within the theory of relativity
are conceptualised in classical terms and have associated a trajectory in space and time.
These ‘classical atoms’, i.e. the conceptual clocks, are not affected by the acceleration,
they still have a time reading equal to the Minkowski proper time. There are situations
in which the pendulum does not behave any more as an ideal clock in Arthur’s sense
(i.e.  its  time keeping does not  correspond to the numerical  value of the Minkowski
proper  time).  In  this  case  it  might  look  as  if  its  worldline  looses  a  metrological
interpretation  in  terms  of  the Minkowski  proper  time.  However  if  we,  so to  speak,
magnify  the  worldline  of  the  complex  system,  and  represent  the  worldlines  of  the
constituting ‘classical atoms’, these enable to maintain the meaning of the Minkowski
interval  for each of these ‘fundamental’  worldlines.  In  this  situation the Minkowski
proper time of the worldline of the complex clock gives the Minkowski proper time of
the  constituting  ‘classical  atoms’;  in  Arthur’s  view,  it  tracks  the  becoming  of  the
18 As  mentioned  in  section  1,  the  atomic/natural  clock  and  related  notion  of  time  (metrologically
implemented through the atomic time scale) is independent of the formulation of the theory and in fact is
taken  into account  in  input  physical  assumptions of  the  theory.  It  is  from measurements  made with
accelerated atomic clocks that we check that the Minkowski proper time in fact gives the time gone by an
atomic system. Not the other way around.
12
‘classical atoms’, and because of this also the becoming of the complex system made of
‘classical atoms’.19
From this we can conclude two things: (1) not taking into account some quantum
phenomena that is outside the scope of the theory, in all cases the Minkowski proper
time can be taken to give the time gone by a physical system (in Arthur’s terms marking
the becoming of the physical systems); (2) Since this happens even for physical systems
whose time reading does not correspond to the Minkowski proper time, as a tool to
determine the actual time gone by a physical system, the Minkowski proper time (i.e.
the  invariant  integral  calculated  along the time-like worldline  of  a  physical  system)
enables to calculate the time gone by a physical systems ‘on top of’ the actual time
reading we might have with the physical system.  
In my view it is this incredible applicability of the Minkowski proper time that we
extend even to physical systems that do not provided any measure of time (i.e. physical
systems that cannot be used as clocks) – since we are considering physical systems
made of atoms – that gives rise to the view of the Minkowski proper time as an almost
fundamental physical quantity predicted by the theory of relativity, giving the time gone
by physical systems for inertial and non-inertial motions. The only thing wrong in this
view  would  be  in  the  adjective  ‘fundamental’,  since  ‘behind’  and  ‘sustaining’  the
Minkowski proper time is the empirical proper time of atoms. 
This view has implications regarding the clock hypothesis. As the counterpart of the
atomic  clock  we  need  for  a  question  of  consistency  that  the  time  reading  that  we
attribute in the theory to the conceptual clock in non-inertial motion (i.e. its proper time)
to be equal to the empirical proper time of an accelerated atomic clock. It turns out that
the theory of relativity provides through the invariance of the Minkowski interval  a
theoretical slot where to fit the experimental result of natural clocks whose rate does not
depend on their past history (i.e. it does not depend in a direct way on its acceleration).
In this way, the ideal clock in Arthur’s sense already emerges as the conceptual clock as
a self-sufficient theoretically independent concept taken to be the counterpart, within the
theory, of natural clocks: the time reading (proper time) of the atomic/conceptual clock
is calculate with/given by the Minkowski proper time.
It is true that we might wonder why the natural clock is like that, and try to develop
a theoretical model that explains why a natural clock does not depend on its past history.
However the notion of natural clock is an input assumption of the theory, and in fact its
‘dynamical’  description,  explaining,  eventually,  the  independence  of  its  rate  on  the
acceleration, must be made totally by reference to theories that are beyond the scope of
the  theory  of  relativity  (at  the  moment  quantum  theories).  This  is  not  the  clock
hypothesis.  In fact the clock hypothesis  is  a very general  dynamical  rule of thumb,
applied within the theory of relativity to the models of real clocks (sometimes making,
in part, a heuristic reference to other theories like quantum mechanics); as such it does
not address natural clocks.20, 21
19 There are however simple physical systems that cannot be seen as constituted by simpler ‘classical
atoms’, which in certain cases do not behave as ideal clocks. One example of a theoretical model with this
characteristic is a type of flavour oscillation clock that when subjected to a rotational acceleration does
not read proper time (Knox 2010). However, in this case, we are considering a theoretical model (with an
eventual real counterpart) that is outside the scope of the theory of relativity. Even the idea of worldline
cannot be applied in the case of a quantum system like the flavour oscillation clock. The natural clock
(not depending on its past history) is conceptualised as an ideal classical clock with a classical worldline.
Quantum systems that do not behave as ideal clocks open interesting questions regarding the notion of
becoming as something that can be tracked by the Minkowski proper time; however this is outside the
scope of the theory of relativity and the views being presented/analysed in this work are only related to
this theory.
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In this way the relevance of the clock hypothesis is much smaller in my account
than in Arthur’s. We might want to apply it case-by-case to models of real clocks, but it
does not have the centrality that it has in Arthur’s account. We do not have to take it as
implicit  in  the  theory  because  of  the  invariant  Minkowski  interval.  This  is  already
‘covered’ by the conceptual clock as the counterpart of the natural clock, which is an
ideal  clock  in  Arthur’s  sense.  Also,  when  adopting  Arthur’s  interpretation  of  the
Minkowski proper time as giving the becoming of physical systems, the ‘becoming’ of
physical  systems  is  still  given  by the  Minkowski  proper  time  even  if  these  do  not
behave as ideal clocks. The ‘clock hypothesis’ would simply provide a general rule of
thumb to predict when the functioning of a physical system as a clock (i.e. its ‘cycles’)
will correspond to its actual becoming (as given by the Minkowski proper time). 
In  the  same  way,  I  would  not  take  the  clock  hypothesis  to  be  a  sort  of  ‘extra
assumption’ as Brown’s view might lead us to think. As mentioned, it turns out to be a
sort of very general ‘dynamical recipe’ for a direct heuristic application of a simple
dynamical reasoning within the theory for the case of real clocks like the balance wheel
clock (i.e. clocks that are not taken into account in the development of the theory as the
atomic clock), to determine when one can expect these clocks to behave like natural
clocks (i.e. to have a time reading when accelerated in accordance to the Minkowski
proper  time).  As  a  dynamical  recipe  or  rule  of  thumb,  the  clock  hypothesis  is  too
general  and  follows  too  directly  from  the  theory’s  dynamics  to  consider  it  as  a
dynamical  assumption  that  “is  not  a  consequence  of  the postulates  of the theory of
relativity” (see, e.g., Brown and Pooley 2001, 264-5).
Also, like in Arthur’s case, the relevance of the clock hypothesis is much smaller in
my account than in Brown’s. We do not need it, like in Brown’s case, to show that we
can  take  the  proper  time  of  conceptual  clocks  as  being  given  by  the  Minkowski
invariant interval. The conceptual clock that corresponds to the natural clock within the
theory, as such, is already an ideal clock reading the Minkowski proper time. Also by
considering physical systems as constituted by atoms (conceptualized in classical terms
within the theory),  the time gone by the physical system is given by the Minkowski
proper  time  even  if  when  accelerated  the  physical  system  as  a  clock  might  be
malfunctioning (i.e. its cycles not being identical to the value of the Minkowski proper
time). Its ‘utility’ is simply to predict up to what acceleration we can expect a real clock
to give a time reading identical to the actual time gone by the clock (that is calculated
using the Minkowski interval).
20 One should not be mislead by references to atomic clocks in the context of discussions regarding the
clock  hypothesis  (see,  e.g.,  Brown  2005,  94-5,  Arthur  2010,  168).  For  example,  in  the  case  of  the
pendulum one is applying basic dynamics of the theory of relativity (see, e.g., Misner et al.  1973, 394-5).
This corresponds to the clock hypothesis as a general (dynamical) rule of thumb expressed in terms of the
concept of force (or potential). In the case of the atomic clock we find physical ‘toy models’ in which the
clock  hypothesis  is  ‘applied’  in  a  completely  heuristic  way  (see,  e.g.,  Ohanian  1976,  207-8).  As
mentioned, taken the ‘clock’ as a self-sufficient concept to be the counterpart within the theory of the
atomic clock that experimentally we find to give a time reading (i.e. to have an empirical proper time)
according to the Minkowski proper time, this fact becomes a physical input assumption of the theory that
is not explained within the theory of relativity. 
21 It is my view that the quantum mechanical description of atoms does not explain the independence on
its past history of natural clocks. Quantum mechanics is ‘built’ on top of the notion of inertial reference
frame with its implicit conceptual rods and clocks. As Dickson mentions, “just as classical physics does,
quantum physics contains an assumption (usually left implicit) that there is some frame (some system of
coordinates) in which the laws are valid” (Dickson 2004, 201). However it is beyond the scope of this
work to develop this issue here. Even if that was not the case it does not affect the views being defended
here in relation to the clock hypothesis.
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5 Further comments
In this work, by taking into account Einstein’s notion of natural clock and the related
boostability assumption, I presented a view on the so-called clock hypothesis, different
from Brown’s and Arthur’s. My treatment of the clock hypothesis goes hand in hand
with a re-evaluation of the notion of proper time in terms of the empirical proper time of
real clocks, something that is already present in Brown’s work. The difference with
Brown is that the empirical proper time is ‘thought’ in terms of the time being given by
natural clocks as defined by Einstein: physical systems whose ‘internal changes’ are
independent  of  their  past  motion.  Natural  clocks  enter  the  theory’s  structure  in  the
articulation of the time coordinate of an inertial reference frame and almost as a hidden
assumption – the boostability assumption –, necessary in Einstein’s view to derive the
Lorentz transformations. As such, the existence of natural clocks is not something that
is predicted by the theory but a physical input assumption.
In my view, regarding this point, the great merit of Einstein’s theory of relativity is
making of its weakness its strength. As we have seen, Einstein was unhappy with the
fact  that  the  theory  relies  on  rods  and clocks  as  self-sufficient  conceptual  elements
necessary to implement the notion of inertial reference frame. However as Minkowski’s
contribution made explicit, the theory is able to ‘find a place’ in its theoretical structure
to a concept of clock that corresponds to the experimental notion of natural clocks. With
the Minkowski  proper time we can fit  into the theory the empirical  proper time of
natural clocks that is (at least in part) implicit in its construction.
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